66

International Law Studies - Volume 62
The Use of Force, Human Rights, and General International Legal Issues
Richard B. Lillich & John Norton Moore (editors)

SOME PERSPECTIVES ON REVOLUTION
Thomas B. Grassey
For many years people in the United
States argued that the outcome of the
Vietnam conflict would have critical
implications for the future of freedom
everywhere. The familiar argument ran:
If the Communists were victorious,
Western security would be weakened;
but if the Communists were defeated in
Vietnam, we would have met "The
Third Challenge," "Wars of Liberation,"
and convinced the enemy that he could
not succeed in world conquest by
proxy.
The insurgency in Vietnam finally
has reached its conclusion. Perhaps now,
more than a decade after American
combat units were introduced to help a
friendly government deal with an externally supported insurgency and 3
years after those forces were withdrawn
*This essay is based on a lecture given in
August 1975 at the Naval Amphibious
School, Coronado, California.

under "peace with honor," it is possible
to see why our counterinsurgency effort
failed.
The paragraph has an odd ring to it.
There is something strange-and'in that
strangeness we may find at least part of
the answer to the question, "Why did
our counterinsurgency efforts fail?" Try
reading the paragraph again, substituting
revolution for insurgency and counterrevolutionary for counterinsurgency.
What I wish to examine, therefore, is
not Vietnam but the fundamental conceptual errors of which Vietnam was
merely a symptom. For if we misconceived the situation, our loss might
not be as ominous as we had feared; if,
however, our misconceptions contributed to or even caused our failure,
we must correct them before they are
repeated.
How we define situations, what
labels we attach to realities, which
words we use in thinking about the
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problems we face greatly influence our
judgments and behavior. If we are bewitched by false labels, we will make
bad decisions. And one of the most
disastrous false labels currently in our
national vocabulary is "counterinsurgency." Of course, it is not an accidental false label; Americans are deeply
opposed to being "counterrevolutionaries." So we almost invented this odd
word and deliberately applied it even to
places where it was wildly inappropriate
(the "meat and potatoes" cases of our
counterinsurgency courses have been
Vietnam, China, Cuba, Algeria and
Malaya). Unwilling to think about
"counterrevolution," we labeled all our
activities "counterinsurgency" and became literally unable to discriminate
between an insurgency and a revolution.
It is time to recall that distinction.
"Insurgency," a word used mostly in
international law, is defined as "a revolt
against a government, not reaching the
proportion of an organized revolution,
and not recognized as belligerency."
Since "insurgency" is defined relative to
revolution, what is a revolution?
A revolution may be distinguished
from a coup d'etat, foreign invasion,
military seizure of power, rebellion, and
insurgency by several indicators. The
most obvious is that a revolution has
sizable (though not always majority)
organized popular support. It aims at a
redistribution of political power, although social, economic and cultural
changes may accompany this shift. It
usually involves violence; some writers
(including Frantz Fanon, Regis Debray
and Karl Marx) consider violence essential to a revolution, but they confuse a
usually necessary tactic with a definition of the goal. "Nonviolent revolution" is not a contradiction in terms:
Gandhi led one such revolution in India,
and Lenin surprised himself by coming
close to a nonviolent Bolshevik revolution in Russia. However, revolutionary
activities must be illegal or the changes
in society, no matter how radical, will

be the results of a constitutional process
(Hitler's 1933 accession to power) or a
successful reform movement (U.S.
women's suffrage). The truly essential
element in revolution is the rejection of
governmental legitimacy: the deliberate
and explicit denial of the government's
right to enforce its rules and laws. So a
revolution is an organized, popularly
based attempt to alter radically the
existing political structure, usually by
violent and always by illegal means.
Of all the myths about revolutions,
the most prominent American misconception is that their cause is material
deprivation-poverty, hunger, bad
health and overcrowding. History does
not support such a thesis, but instead
offers Jlotable exceptions. In 1958 Cuba
had a large middle class and one of the
highest per capit~_ incomes in Latin
America. It should have been one of the
least likely candidates for revolution in
the Western Hemisphere if the "deprivation" thesis were true. Although grinding poverty is endemic to India, that
country has not experienced a revolution since achieving independence. The
Poles and Hungarians had incipient revolutions in 1956 although they enjoyed
higher standards of living than their
quiescent bloc neighbors. Historians
agree that the American Revolution did
not result from material want. It is true
that poverty is a prominent feature of
most societies facing revolution; but the
difference between correlation and
causation is one which we Americans
persistently ignore in justifying foreign
aid, planning military civic action programs, sponsoring the Peace Corps, and
studying revolution.
Curiously, the notion that material
deprivation causes revolution is purely
Marxian. Marx thought his great "discovery" was that economics determines
the structure and processes of every
society.
The general conclusion at
which I arrived ... may be briefly
summed up as follows: In the
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social production which men
carry on they enter into definite
relations that are indispensable
and independent of their will;
these relations of production correspond to a definite stage of
development of their material
powers of production. The sum
total of these relations constitutes
the economic structure of society
-the real foundation, on which
rise legal and political superstructures and to which correspond
definite forms of social consciousness. The mode of production in
material life determines the general character of the social, political, and spiritual processes of life.
It is not the consciousness of men
that determines their existence,
but, on the contrary, their social
existence determines their consciousness. At a certain stage
... the material forces of production in society come into conflict
with the ... property relations
within which they had been at
work before .... Then comes the
period of social revolution.!
Marx believed that, by its very nature, capitalism must lead to greater and
greater disparity between the rich few
and the impoverished masses, with
worse and worse material exploitation
of the laboring class. Finally, and inevitably, the oppressed will rise in revolution against the world's rich to abolish
private property and establish the classless, Communist society. Although
Americans often accept and promulgate
this strictly Marxist idea that poverty,
hunger and bad living conditions cause
revolutions, the fact is they do not.
Conversely, despite our national preoccupation with material wealth, revolutions cannot be prevented merely with
better food,. housing, clothing and
health care. Marx was wrong, and so is
this American myth of what causes (or
prevents) revolution.
Some social scientists (e.g.,

Durkheim, Lasswell), after considerable
research, have concluded that the cause
of revolution is frustration. We encounter graphs and tabular charts,
"curves of rising expectations," measures of individual discontent and social
anomie, and useful or obscurant
theories of cohesion and social breakdown. Brian Crozier begins his book:
Frustration is the one element
common to all rebels, whatever
their aims, political ideals or social
backgrounds. ... What, then, is
frustration? For my purpose, it is
simply the inability to do something one badly wants to do,
through circumstances beyond
one's control. 2
One may readily agree that a revolutionary is frustrated, but this is not a
markedly useful distinction since almost
all human beings are in various ways
frustrated. Moreover, many of these
theories are simplistic blanket notions
that barely cover the heroic dedication
one finds among revolutionaries. John
Paul Jones' crew, Washington's Valley
Forge army, and Nathan Hale were
"frustrated." Algerians who were
brutally tortured by French paratroopers resisted because of "the disparity between goal visualization and
goal achievement." Ho Chi Minh was a
revolutionary for 60 years because he
experienced severe social anomie, and so
forth. Since social scientists are reluctant to make implicit value judgments
by using words like "good," "bad,"
"right," and "wrong" (a scientist "ob_
serves facts," he does not "make moral
judgments"), and due to our own preoccupation with material wealth, we
have all but forgotten the classical political theory upon which America was
built.
"The masses of men make revolution," Aristotle wrote, "under the idea
that they are unjustly treated.,,3 Justice, for Aristotle, consisted of treating
equals alike and unequals differently,
but in proportion to their relevant
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differences. This supports the idea that
all men are equal in a fundamental sense
(the right to be treated justly), yet it
allows for dissimilar treatment based on
inequalities among men. We are not
obliged to hold that justice requires
treating everyone alike, so that all of us
must receive identical amounts of food,
clothing, housing, education, entertainment and honors. But we are required
to show that some relevant difference
between persons justifies the privileges,
benefits and burdens each is assigned.
Thus a ship's captain is entitled to
treatment different than a deckhand's
because of the difference in responsibilities. Even so, this is always proportional, and there are limits beyond
which the captain-deckhand differentiation cannot be presumed to justify
extreme disparities in treatment.
If "the masses of men make revolution under the idea that they are unjustly treated," the key question is:
What do men think is unjust? For
injustice is not a natural phenomenon
like rainfall or difference in height; it is
a human concept, dependent for its
existence on value judgments made by
individuals. Feudal serfs who believed
that God made some men to be poor,
cold, hungry serfs and other men to be
rich, warm, well-fed lords saw no injustice in their situation. Despite being
miserable themselves, and aware of their
baron's luxuries, they did not revolt.
Our modern world has parallels: with a
long Brahmin-Parish caste heritage,
Indian society has tended to accept as
just great inequalities in the treatment
of people. Mao Tse-tung wrote that his
biggest problem in 1928 was getting the
peasants to realize that something was
wrong with Chinese society, that something better was feasible. Fidel Castro's
main support came not from the peasants but the educated and middle class
-those who were materially comfortable but who felt unjustly excluded
from a genuine political process.
A revolutionary situation exists when

people feel unjustly treated to a severe
degree, and not because of poverty,
frustration or even glaring social inequalities. John Adams understood this
point. He knew that the American
struggle was not really over taxes or the
king's policies or various acts of Parliament. The issue was sovereignty, the
right in justice of a people to govern
themselves, and Adams wrote:
The Revolution was effected
before the war commenced. The
Revolution was in the hearts and
minds of the people .... This radical change in the principles,
opinions, sentiments and affections of the people, was the real
American Revolution. 4 [His
emphasis.]
Another myth which we Americans
have incorporated in our current view of
revolution is that of the outside agitator. It is true that a revolution requires
leadership and organization. Someone
must think "this is unjust"; someone
must propagandize to convince others
that there is an attractive and attainable
alternative to the present-felt injustice;
and someone must be willing to break
laws, engage in violence, and risk his
own safety and security to oppose the
"oppressor." These roles of thinker,
propagandist, and activist define revolutionary leadership; they may be filled
by one man (Lenin) or several (Jefferson, Paine, Washington). But because
leadership is necessary for a revolution,
many people mistakenly believe that it
is sufficient to cause a revolution. This
is tantamount to arguing that because
oxygen is necessary for a fire, the
presence of oxygen will cause a fire.
Common views found in much of our
counterinsurgency literature and attitudes are that Lenin, Ho, Fidel, or Mao
and a small band of conspirators succeeded in their efforts without genuine
popular support; that ignorant people
were duped; that a small faction compelled reluctant support through mass
terror; or that a skilled propagandist
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whipped a minor gripe into an unwarranted revolutionary issue.
The commonly ignored point is that
no revolution can succeed without at
least the passive support of a sizable
segment of the population, support
which the revolutionaries can gain only
through governmental indifference,
stupidity or callousness. Considering the
resource imbalance between an established government and a nascent revolutionary movement, the vulnerability of
conspirators, the isolation of urban and
rural guerrillas, and the inherent tendencies of people to obey the law and
oppose radical change ("All Experience
hath shown that mankind are more
disposed to suffer, while Evils are sufferable, than to right themselves by
abolishing the Forms to which they are
accustomed"s), it is surprising that
revolutions occur at all. Yet throughout
history we have heard the weary refrain
of privileged groups denying the reality
and legitimacy of anger among the less
fortunate. Plato and Cicero reported it,
and it may be found prominently in the
English Civil War debates and British
colonial empire discussions, as well as in
the literature defending American
slavery. More recently we have heard
the denial of any genuine problem, the
same automatic response-"outside agitators"-to civil rights protests, student
campus violence, urban ghetto riots, and
military race relations conflicts.
The myth of the outside agitator is
an understandable and very human
response, because those who are
privileged cannot easily appreciate that
many people really are terribly angry
about the way the world is. It is
difficult to see a situation as unjust
unless one is the victim. Consequently,
those who are privileged tend to deny
that there is injustice and blame the
turmoil on "outside agitators." Thus, in
1857, George Fitzhugh wrote:
We warn the North that every
one of the leading abolitionists is
agitating the negro slavery

question merely as a means to
attain their ulterior ends ... a surrender to Socialism and Communism-to no private property, no
church, no law; to free love, free
lands, free women and free
children. 6
That sad blindness of the South's
leading apologist for slavery existed,
ironically, six years after Friedrich
Engels had naively claimed (in the New
York Daily Tribune):

The times of that superstition
which attributed revolutions to
the ill will of a few agitators have
long passed away. Everyone
knows nowadays that wherever
there is a revolutionary convulsion, there must be some social
want in the background which is
prevented by outworn institutions
from satisfying itself. 7
If "outside agitators" are not blamed
for causing revolutions, "ignorance" is.
But as Ted Gurr has noted about this
explanation:
Man's resort to political violence is in part unreasoning, but
does not occur without reason.
Ignorance is almost always among
its causes: sometimes ignorance of
its consequences by those who
resort to it, more often ignorance
by those who create and maintain
the social conditions that inspire
it. 8
So what we see in the myth of the
outside agitator is an attempt by the
fortunate to explain away the anger of
those crying "injustice!" by attributing
it to external provocateurs and ignorance. Woodrow Wilson recognized and
eloquently criticized such self-delusion:
Men do not start revolutions in
a sudden passion .... Revolutions
do not spring up overnight. Revolutions come from the long suppression of the human spirit.
Revolutions come because men
know that they have rights and
that they are disregarded. 9
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Support of the people is the central
theme of every revolutionary leader and
theoretician. It is obvious from even the
most casual perusal of revolutionary
literature or history that the majority of
the people must at least passively accept
the revolutionaries' activities. Trotsky
learned this in abortive Bolshevik attempts to "inspire" revolutions in
Berlin, Munich, Hungary, Hamburg, Bulgaria and Estonia; "Permanent Revolution" was abandoned. Lin Piao renounced Chinese initiation of revolution
in other nations, saying:
The liberation of the masses is
accomplished by the masses themselves-this is a basic principle of
Marxism-Leninism. Revolution or
people's war in any country is the
business of the masses in that
country and should be carried out
primarily by their own efforts;
there is no other way .... Foreign
aid can play only a supplementary
role. 10
Che Guevara, Cuba's Trotsky who
thought that with 50 men he could
wage a successful revolution anywhere
in Latin America, brilliantly diagnosed
his own failure:
Where a government has come
into power through some popular
vote, fraudulent or not, and maintains at least an appearance of
constitutional legality, the guerrilla outbreak cannot be promoted
since the possibilities of peaceful
struggle have not yet been exhausted . ... This is clearly seen
by considering the case of bandit
gangs. They have all the characteristics of a guerrilla army .... The
only thing missing is support of
the people; and, inevitably, those
gangs are captured and exterminated. 11
A third myth in our American approach to revolution is the myth of the
military victory. Because governments
tend to deny the strength, legitimacy
and even the existence of revolutionary

movements, they postpone reaction
until the situation has grown quite
serious. Then military forces are assigned to "solve the problem." Admiral
Zumwalt told a 1974 Tufts University
audience tha~ as a rear admiral in 1963
he had written that "our national interest would not be served by becoming
militarily involved" in Vietnam; his report, he said, was overruled by a Pentagon civilian, Dr. Daniel Ellsberg.12 If
there is any hope at all for the military
commander to accomplish his mission,
he must remember the two preceding
myths and seek a governmental response
to the causes (the perceived injustices)
even more than to the symptoms (violence, political terrorism) of the revolution. Military professional training inculcates an aggressive, "can do," resultoriented attitude, with "results" almost
inevitably thought of as quantifiable.
Performance tends to be judged on
things we can count: patrols, arrests,
raids, "pacified hamlets," and casualties.
Meaningless rules-of-thumb, like "10:1
(or 15:1) is the magic troops: guerrillas
ratio for victory," acquire holy auras. It
is imperative that the commander and
his subordinates appreciate how little
these numbers may correlate with mission accomplishment. No matter how
good the numbers look, the revolution
may be succeeding. "My feeling," said
Marine Corps Commandant Wallace M.
Greene in 1966, "is that you could kill
every Vietcong and North Vietnamese
in South Vietnam and still lose the
war. ,,13 Strictly speaking, armed force
is only a temporary shoring device
which may briefly reestablish social
order in a time of tumult; it offers the
government one last chance to alleviate
the grievances fueling the revolution. It
is not, per se, a solution.
The heart of the revolutionaries'
claim is that they are right, not that
they are stronger; a successful military
occupation proves nothing against that
conviction. If men feel unjustly treated,
military patrols, curfews, and searches
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(no matter how polite) will not change
their opinion. In fact, such measures
themselves lend plausibility to revolutionary propaganda that the government is hostile to and oppressive of
the people's rights and welfare. Indeed,
a prime ambition of many revolutionaries is to provoke a harsh military
crackdown; it bolsters their claims that
the unjust government will resist by
force of arms any peaceful reform
attempt, so a violent revolution is
necessary. The paradigm of a military
success/political catastrophe was
General Massu's ruthless and complete
annihilation of every known member
of the Algerian FLN leadership by use
of martial law, torture and counterterrorism. Many Algerians consider
Massu's military "success" in the
Casbah the point when their revolution
for independnece became irreversible
because an amicable political settlement had been made impossible. Short
of genocide, there is no military
solution to a revolutionary situation
because a revolution is a contest of
ideas rather than arms, of justice and
allegiance rather than firepower and
body counts. We forget these points
again at our own peril.
The world's population is today
approximately 4 billion people. Overall, the growth rate is about 2 percent
per annum Each day, therefore, there
are nearly 200,000 more human beings
alive than there were the day before;
every passing second adds two and a
quarter persons. This is not births, but
births minus deaths, or net growth. In
the time it would take a nuclear task
force to sail from the United States to
the Persian Gulf-2 weeks or so at a
30-knot speed of advance-the world's
population would have increased by 3
million people. That is roughly equivalent to the population of Honduras,
Ireland, Israel, Laos, Lebanon, New
Zealand, Somalia or Uruguay added to
the world during transit. If present
population trends continue, there will

be twice as many people on the planet
in 2006 as there were in 1973.
A second consideration: The wealth
of the world is unevenly distributed.
Fewer than a quarter of the world's
inhabitants possess three-quarters of
the riches. Two-thirds of the people
live in "underdeveloped countries";
their children under the age of 15
equal in number the entire populations
of the world's developed nations. And
the gap between rich and poor is opening, not closing. A decade ago our per
capita income was nearly $3,000 while
the World Bank classified 38 countries
"very poor" with per capita incomes
below $100. Discounting inflation
"growth," our real per capita income is
projected to reach $4,500 by the end
of the century; the very poor nations
will reach $160.
Third in importance to population
and the distribution of wealth is the
continuing worldwide tendency to
urbanize, Westernize, and communicate. By living in or near a large city,
by viewing a movie or the village teleVlSlon, more and more people of the
world are seeing glimpses of how
others live and of what they themselves do not have. This is much too
meager to be called "education" about
other lands-even "awareness" may
overstate the case-but it is a glimpse,
an image, an impression.
If these trends of population
growth, economics, and increased communication of images continue, there
will be greater and greater known disparity between the world's rich and
poor. "The wretched of the earth" (as
Fanon called them), increasing in number three times as fast as the world's
comfortable people, more and more
will be seeing glimpses of what they do
not have. Inevitably, they will recognize the difference between what life is
like for the fortunate and what it is
like for them and their children. And
they will call it unjust.
So, if Aristotle was right that the
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masses of men make revolution under
the idea that they are unjustly treated,
the world must seem to be on the
verge of a profound revolution. The
remainder of this century promises
great political instability in the world,
numerous periods of tension among
nations about questions of justice, and
frequent temptations to use naval or
military force to achieve national
objectives. Standing behind our
nation's actions will be an implicit
proclamation of what we, as a people,
value. Particularly important, how the
United States perceives and reacts to
revolution will be largely shaped by,
and will directly affect, those in
uniform today.
I think we should reexamine the
prevalent belief that the world struggle
is between communism and capitalism,
with the Communists engaged in an
international effort against capitalist
societies. Not since Trotsky's failures
has the Communist Party been truly
international. Lenin abandoned Turkish
and Persian Communists in courting
both Ataturk and the Shah for border
adjustments. The Korean and Indonesian parties were expelled from the
Comintern in 1927 for unauthorized
revolutionary efforts. Stalin directed the
Chinese Communists to work with
Chiang in 1925, which led to Chiang's
liquidation of most of the CCP leadership. (Mao and Chou barely escaped
"the great headhunt"-Mao's first wife
did not.) In 1936 Stalin told the Spanish Communists to forget revolution and
to side with the Republicans. The German and Polish Communist parties were
sacrificed for the 1939 Ribbentrop Pact.
After the war, Stalin directed the
French Communists to support de
Gaulle, the Italians to accept Badoglio
(despite a strong partisan base for revolution), Tito to agree to a restoration of
the Yugoslav monarchy, and Mao to
form a coalition with Chiang. The
French Communists enraged Ho Chi
Minh by opposing independence for

Indochina during the 1946 elections.
In fact, the Soviets did very little for
the Chinese, Algerian, or Cuban revolutionaries during their wars. Gr62k Communists had to rely, uneasily, on Yugoslav aid because Stalin gave them virtually no help. The Cuban Communist
Party had a comfortable modus vivendi
with Batista, and when Castro called a
1958 general strike, the Communistcontrolled unions ignored it. Indeed, the
Cuban Communist Party had no formal
contact with Castro's army until a few
months before Batista fled.
Among non-Communist countries,
the Soviet Union has given the greatest
amounts of aid to Egypt, Syria, Iraq,
India and Indonesia. In every one of
these nations, the Communist Party was
at one time or is now illegal and party
members have been jailed or executed.
Such prohibitions and prosecutions have
not necessarily affected the flow of aid.
Also, on the whole, Chinese and other
Communist regimes have given relatively
little aid to fellow Communist revolutionaries. Finally, Sino-Soviet border
battles, support of opposing factions in
Angola, and counteracting policies in
the Indo-Pakistani conflict, are glaring
contradictions to the idea of a "United
Communist Movement."
The upshot of all this is that "an
international solidarity of Communists"
simply does not exist. That concept fails
to explain Soviet or Chinese foreign
policy with any rational consistency.
National self-interest, however, does
adequately and coherently account for
Soviet and Chinese decisions; greater
attention should be paid to national
priorities than to ideological purity. It
was neither Dean Acheson nor Dean
Rusk who warned, "The policy of
Russia is changeless .... Its methods, its
tactics, its maneuvers may change, but
the polar star of its policy-world
domination-is a fixed star." Karl Marx
made that observation more than a
century ago;14 he was, obviously, not
always wrong.
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The Russians have noticed that of
the seven nations which have become
Communist without Red Army "help,"
three-China, Albania and Yugoslaviahave proved very unreliable "allies."
(Vietnam, Laos and Cambodia are uncertain; only Cuba seems steady.) They
are further annoyed by the fickleness of
aid recipients such as Egypt, Ghana,
Syria and Indonesia. The obvious conclusion is that military conquest is the
fail-proof method of gaining reliable
control of a strategically important area.
While land-bound border expansion in
several directions still may be attractive
to Soviet planners, the new vistas
opened by a powerful Soviet Navy
appear at least as dangerous to the West.
If a Communist revolution were to
develop in an area of great value to the
Russians, they might attempt to land
and sustain a support force-a contingency the U.S. Navy might be tasked
with preventing. 1 5 Our particular concern, then, is not with Communist
revolutions per se, but rather with
Soviet military intervention and usurpation of a revolution for her own national interest.
It also is important to note that our
"counterinsurgency" attitude stems
from a colossal feat of politicallegerdemain. At the 1961 World Communist
Congress, Nikita Khrushchev unilaterally declared that all "Third World
people's wars" were in the interests of,
and would be supported by, communism. Two weeks later when John F.
Kennedy became President, Khrushchev's premise was swallowed whole:
Roger Hilsman, Walt Rostow and Maxwell Taylor launched us into the Green
Beret Counterinsurgency era. (Years
later, David Halberstam would write,
very high Soviet officials told their
American counterparts that it was all a
misunderstanding, that the talk was
aimed at the Chinese for propaganda
and rhetoric purposes. 1 6 ) Misunderstanding or not, our reaction was a
mistake, for it simply is not true that all

Third World revolutionary activity is
beneficial to the Russians or Chinese.
Much of it reflects legitimate aspirations
of people to achieve domestic justice by
overthrowing colonial, racist or oligarchical tyrannies.
Our "counterinsurgency" attitude
often has caused, tragically, what it was
intended to prevent-the growth of antiAmericanism. "Neocolonialism," for
instance, essentially is the accusation
that American foreign policy is predominantly guided by economic selfinterest, that we support repressive
regimes to protect our overseas investments. The use of bribes and kickbacks
by American corporations; diplomatic
and military backing of dictatorships in
return for base rights; CIA interference
in other nations' political processes; the
"destabilization" of democratically
chosen governments which threaten
American investments; attempted "prejudicial terminations" of various foreign
leaders; police, army and intelligence
"advisors" to help tyrannical but proWestern governments frustrate popular
uprisings; and covert or overt (as in
Santo Domingo) American military interventions have been argued to be the
rule rather than the exception in our
foreign relations. While a free enterprise
economic system may prove the best
way to try to meet the world's burgeoning population needs, it would be foolish to deny that there has been economic exploitation of the lesser
developed nations and that the central
injustice in most Third World countries
today is a grossly inequitable distribution of wealth, for whatever reason.
Revolutionary movements quite' naturally will be directed against that injustice; and, not uncommonly, U.S.
overseas presence and investments will
be labeled "colonialist." Further, the
fact that they are living in misery while
we experience unprecedented luxury
strikes many of the world's poor as
unjust. To them, free enterprise seems a
license to exploit. But for us to call all
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these revolutions "Communist insurgencies" is to make them what they need
not be.
Western political theory holds that
the purpose of business is profit, the
purpose of government is justice, and
the two are not the same. Marxists deny
this; they contend that government is
merely an instrument of exploitative
class oppression. Thus, Marx's grand
challenge was his claim that the rich of
the world can only try to become even
richer. Capitalists may talk about peace,
freedom and justice, he said-they "may
even throw the oppressed some meager
sops to ease their own consciences-but
the truth of their actions belies their
protestations: they are economically
enslaved to place property ahead of
justice, gain ahead of rights, material
goods ahead of human dignity. According to Marx, all political decisions,
democratic notions, lofty declarations
of brotherhdod, even religious and
moral principles are subordinate to
fundamental greed. The rich never will
voluntarily give up their privileges, never
peacefully consent to the reallocation of
wealth which justice requires-this can
be achieved only by violent revolution.
Hence, the Manifesto concludes that
Communist ends "can be attained
only by the forcible overthrow of all
existing social conditions. Let the
ruling classes tremble at a Communist
revol u tion. The proletarians have
nothing to lose but their chains. They
have a world to win. Workers of the
world, unite!"! 7
The world's poor, growing in number
and feeling unjustly treated, will surely
hear Marx's claim. We, the world's rich
growing richer, must answer it. What do
we stand for? How will we use our
power? What do Americans valueliberty, or our standard of living? What
goals do our armed forces serve-justice,
or profit and privilege?
Because the Defense Department
plays so significant a role in shaping our
foreign policy, considerable astuteness is

required of military leaders. Short-term
expedience must be carefully weighed
with attention to our long-term national
values. Policies that imply Marx's economic determinism will have to be
balanced against our heritage from
Jefferson and Lincoln. While there always have been evil men who would
impose their Auschwitzes and Gulags
worldwide unless deterred by brave men
in arms, there also are other, more subtle,
crimes against humanity-surfeit in a sea
of want, ethnic and religious domination, various political exclusions-which
now are awakening revolutions. Those
who feel such injustices will judge the
United States by how our armed forces
are used; so it will not be enough to
oppose the Gulags and proclaim "freedom and liberty" if we support oligarchies, dictatorial juntas, and "proWestern" tyrannies against revolution.
But all too often, "counterinsurgency"
has meant just that.
Military leaders must be more attentive, then, to the causes of revolution,
the limited relevance of military power
to deal with an essentially political
struggle, and the implications of American support to governments facing revolution. They also should be aware that
90 percent of mankind is non-White.
Africans, Asians and Latin Americansthe whole Third World-form opinions
about America by seeing how their
distant relatives-Black, Oriental and
Hispanic Americans-are treated, especially in military units deployed overseas. If our armed forces deter international aggression, if our foreign policy
recognizes the legitimate grounds of
many revolutions, and if our national
experience demonstrates that the
United States stands for justice and
human respect as well as material prosperity, then we may look hopefully at
Karl Marx's prediction: "Russia has
only one opponent: the explosive power
of democratic ideas, that inborn urge of
the human race in the direction of
freedom."! 8

76
NOTES
1. Karl Marx, A Contribution to the Critique of Political Economy; reprinted in Social and
Political Philosophy, edited by J. Somerville and R.E. Santoni (Garden City, N.Y.: Doubleday
and Co., 1963), p. 379.
2. Brian Crozier, The Rebels (Boston: Beacon Press, 1960), pp. 15, 16.
3. Politics 1303b5; in The Basic Works of Aristotle, edited by Richard McKeon (New
York: Random House, 1941), p. 1237.
4. John Adams, letter to Hezekiah Niles, 13 February 1818; in The Works of John Adams
(Boston: Little, Brown and Co., 1856), vol. X, pp. 282, 283.
5. The Declaration of Independence.
6. George Fitzhugh; quoted in Charles A. Madison, Critics and Crusaders: a Century of
American Protest (New York: Ungar, 1959), p. 5.
7. Friedrich Engels, The New York Daily Tribune, 25 October 1851; reprinted in Friedrich
Engels, Germany: Revolution and Counter-Revolution (New York: International Publishers,
1933), p. 9.
8. Ted R. Gurr, Why Men Rebel (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1970), p. 359.
9. Woodrow Wilson; quoted in C.L. Su1zberger, Unfinished Revolution: America and The
Third World (New York: Atheneum, 1965), p. 5.
10. Lin Piao, Long Live the Victory of the People's War (1965); reprinted in full, Samuel B.
Griffith, Brigadier General, USMC (Ret.), Peking and People's War (New York: Praeger, 1966),
pp. 85, 88.
11. Che Guevara, Guerrilla Warfare (New York: Vintage Books, 1969), pp. 2, 4.
12. Elmo Zumwalt, Admiral, USN; quoted in The New York Times, 19 Apri11974, p. 42:2.
13. Wallace M. Greene, General, USMC; quoted in Arthur M. Schlesinger, Jr., The Bitter
Heritage-Vietnam and American Democracy 1941-1966 (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1967), p.
48.
14. Karl Marx, "Poland's European Mission (1867)"; reprinted in Karl Marx and Friedrich
Engels, The Russian Menace to EUrope, edited by P. Blackstock and B. Hoselitz (Glencoe, Ill.:
The Free Press, 1952), p. 106.
15. This was originally written before the Havana-Angola airlift occurred. The logistic
limitations of that tactic (e.g., no bulk cargoes such as POL, and requirements of secure airspace
and good airfields) are familiar to military planners and would have been obvious had a
functioning Angolan government existed or had Western response been more vigorous. The
movement of Soviet naval amphibious units along Africa's west coast suggested an appreciation
of airlift vulnerability.
16. David Halberstam, The Best and The Brightest (Greenwich, Conn.: Fawcett Publica·
tions, 1973), p. 152.
17. Karl Marx and Friedrich Engels, final paragraph of The Communist· Manifesto.
18. Karl Marx; quoted in The Reader's Digest, June 1964, p. 231.

----'Ji----

